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Abstract Smith and Church (2018) present a “testi-
monial” review of dissociable learning processes in com-
parative and cognitive psychology, by which we mean
they include only the portion of the available evidence
that is consistent with their conclusions. For example,
they conclude that learning the information-integration
category-learning task with immediate feedback is im-
plicit, but do not consider the evidence that people
readily report explicit strategies in this task, nor that
this task can be accommodated by accounts that make
no distinction between implicit and explicit processes.
They also consider some of the neuroscience relating to
information-integration category learning, but do not
report those aspects that are more consistent with an
explicit than an implicit account. They further con-
clude that delay conditioning in humans is implicit, but
do not report evidence that delay conditioning requires
awareness; nor do they present the evidence that con-
ditioned taste aversion, which should be explicit under
their account, can be implicit. We agree with Smith and
Church that it is helpful to have a clear definition of as-
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sociative theory, but suggest that their definition may
be unnecessarily restrictive. We propose an alternative
definition of associative theory and briefly describe an
experimental procedure that we think may better dis-
tinguish between associative and non-associative pro-
cesses.
Keywords categorization · classical conditioning ·
connectionist models · metacognition
Summary of the target article
We begin with a brief summary of Smith and Church’s
(2018) article. The authors start out by noting that as-
sociative learning has long been a dominant framework
in comparative psychology, but that cognitive psychol-
ogists often study situations that seemingly transcend
associative learning, instead implicating explicit, con-
scious, cognitive processes. Their article is concerned
with how to bring these ideas together: how best to
characterize the relationship (and differences) between
associative and cognitive processes.
Smith and Church first illustrate this idea via the
phenomenon of uncertainty responses in non-human an-
imals; that is, responses that allow an animal to termi-
nate the current experimental trial in (for example) a
perceptual discrimination task. These responses are re-
ferred to as “uncertainty” responses because they are
more likely to occur on difficult trials than on easy tri-
als, and hence are taken as evidence of a metacognitive
state of uncertainty when faced with a difficult discrim-
ination. Smith and Church argue that some types of
uncertainty response are problematic for an associative
learning account but naturally fit an explicit metacog-
nitive account (p. 1568).
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Smith and Church then turn their attention to a
particular kind of category-learning task—the informa-
tion integration (II) task—which they argue instanti-
ates a “strong and sustainable associative-learning con-
struct” (p. 1568). This argument is based, in part, on
their view that humans lack conscious access to their
strategy in the II task and, in part, on the involve-
ment of the basal ganglia in II learning. Smith and
Church go on to argue that inserting a brief delay be-
tween response and feedback in the II task leads to the
“disabling of associative learning”, with participants
switching over to their explicit-declarative system (p.
1571). They subsequently expand on this idea, arguing
that delaying feedback has similar effects in classical
conditioning—that classical conditioning with a brief
delay between cue and outcome (trace conditioning) is
explicit, while classical conditioning without a delay is
associative/implicit.
In the final part of their article, Smith and Church
argue for the importance of a clear definition of associa-
tive learning. Their definition involves concrete stimu-
lus inputs, simple behavioral outputs, immediate feed-
back, and the involvement of the basal ganglia. They
argue that, under their definition, small changes in the
sequencing and timing of reinforcement can qualita-
tively change the character of learning from associative
to explicit. They argue that this effectively provides
an “off-switch” for the primitive associaitve learning
system, and that selectively disabling associative learn-
ing in this way may encourage non-human animals to
“raise their cognitive game to the explicit level” (p.
1579). They further argue that the ability to switch
off the associative system may provide a useful tool in
the context of development and education; for example
by allowing mathematics instructors to suppress chil-
dren’s rote, automatic habits and instead teach at a “a
higher, explicit, conceptual level” (p. 1580).
Overview of our Comment
We agree with Smith and Church (2018) that it would
be helpful to have a clear definition of associative learn-
ing. Our central critique is that progress on this clear
definition is less likely to be made if one considers only
the evidence consistent with one’s preferred definition.
Our Comment has the following structure. In the next
section, we consider Smith and Church’s review of work
on the information-integration category structure, in-
cluding the effects of introducing feedback delay. Then
we consider their review of the effects of feedback delay
in classical conditioning. Next, we present some defi-
nitions and clarifications that are used in subsequent
sections, before turning to Smith and Church’s review
of work on uncertainty responses in non-human ani-
mals. We go on to counsel against Smith and Church’s
recommendations for comparative and cognitive psy-
chology, and make some alternative recommendations.
We favor a definition of associative theory based on
the concept of non-recurrent network architectures, and
briefly describe the Shanks-Darby experimental proce-
dure (Shanks & Darby, 1998), in which human behavior
is non-associative by this definition, while rat and pi-
geon behavior is associative. Finally, we contrast testi-
monial reviews with balanced reviews, and suggest that
scientific progress is more likely to be assisted by the
latter.
The information-integration category-learning
task
In this task, participants classify simple abstract stim-
uli (see Figure 1A) into categories, and receive feedback
on their responses. An optimal description of the cat-
egory structure in this task (see Figure 1B) would be
something like “category A items are more dense than
they are large”. However, because the two dimensions
use different, non-commensurable units, such a descrip-
tion is considered difficult or impossible to verbalize in
practice—for the statement “more dense than large” to
make sense, density and size must be converted to some
common unit of measurement.
Smith and Church argue that “humans seem to lack
conscious access to how they perform category tasks of
this kind. They cannot declare the content of their cat-
egory knowledge to others” (p. 1569). However, they
present no evidence in support of this claim. When
awareness is measured in this task, participants readily
verbalize multi-dimensional strategies (Edmunds, Mil-
ton, & Wills, 2015; Edmunds, Wills, & Milton, 2019).
The strongest tenable version of Smith and Church’s ar-
gument is thus that the strategies participants verbalize
are not the ones they use. One might see such a claim as
supported by the fact that the strategies people verbal-
ize in this task are poorly related to the strategies indi-
cated by standard decision-bound computational mod-
eling of their categorization responses (Edmunds et al.,
2015, 2019). However, this decision–bound modeling is
flawed (Edmunds, Milton, & Wills, 2018). The flaw is
sufficiently fundamental that the results reported in
Smith, Boomer, et al. (2014) – a key paper in Smith and
Church’s review – can be modeled under the assump-
tion that all participants in the information-integration
task use easily–verbalizable multidimensional rules
(Edmunds et al., 2018), see also Donkin, Newell, Kalish,
Dunn, and Nosofsky (2015) for a related conclusion.
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Fig. 1 A–C.: Category-learning task. A. Four example stimuli: rectangles of fixed aspect ratio, differing in size, and pixel
density (see e.g. Smith et al., 2014). B. Information-integration category structure; each point represents one stimulus of a
defined size and pixel density, color represents category membership. C. Conjunction category structure. D–F.: Shanks-Darby
procedure. D. Example trial in a typical adult human procedure (procedure has also been used with different stimuli in rats
and pigeons). E. Simplified design; letters represent foods, + = patient gets sick, - = patient feels fine, ? = untrained stimuli
assessed at test. F. Rule- versus similarity-based generalization at test.
Smith and Church also discuss research concerning
the insertion of a delay between response and feedback
in the information– integration task (Maddox & Ing,
2005). We agree inserting such a delay can impair per-
formance in category learning, but this effect is not re-
stricted to information-integration category structures
—similarly-sized effects can also be seen with category
structures that are non–associative under Smith and
Church’s definition (Dunn, Newell, & Kalish, 2012).
Thus, this evidence does not support the case that learn-
ing of infor-mation-integration category structures is
qualitatively different from the learning of other cate-
gory structures, or that immediacy of feedback critically
determines whether learning is mediated by associative
or explicit-declarative systems.
We also agree with much of Smith and Church’s
summary of the neural structures underlying information-
integration category learning. However, similar neural
structures are also involved in learning other category
structures that, by Smith and Church’s definition, are
nonassociative. For example, a conjunction category
structure (Figure 1C) can be optimally described by
an easy-to-verbalize rule (e.g. “Category A items are
small and dense”), and indeed this structure is consid-
ered to be a canonical example of a rule-based task
by multiple-system theorists (e.g. Filoteo, Lauritzen,
& Maddox, 2010). However, the brain regions involved
in learning a (rule-based) conjunction category struc-
ture largely overlap with the regions involved in learn-
ing an infor-mation-integration structure (Carpenter,
Wills, Bennattayallah, & Milton, 2016). Critically, this
overlap includes the basal ganglia – a key component of
Smith and Church’s proposed associative learning sys-
tem.
Hence, the relationship between the activation of
particular brain regions and the involvement of specific
mental processes is less clear than Smith and Church
suggest. Further, to the extent there are differences in
brain activation between conjunction and information-
integration category learning, these differences seem con-
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trary to Smith and Church’s account. In particular,
learning an information- integration structure leads to
greater hippocampal activation than learning a con-
junction structure (Carpenter et al., 2016). In contrast,
Smith and Church argue that hippocampal involvement
is characteristic of explicit, rule-based (non-assoc-iative)
learning, and thus Carpenter et al.’s result seems incon-
sistent with Smith and Church’s theory.
Classical conditioning
Aiming to expand their case about feedback delay be-
yond category learning, Smith and Church turn to evi-
dence on classical conditioning in humans. They argue
that classical conditioning with a brief delay between
cue and outcome (trace conditioning) is explicit, while
classical conditioning without a delay is implicit. They
support this claim by citing work by Squire and col-
leagues (e.g. Clark & Squire, 1998), and use this work
to reinforce their argument that brief feedback delays
induce a switch from an implicit associative system to
an explicit-dec-larative system.
Our first critique of this section is that it out of
date—they cite 18 studies concerning the role of aware-
ness in classical conditioning, but all are at least 17
years old. This is important because more recent re-
search (e.g. Kattner, Ellermeier, & Tavakoli, 2012; Wei-
demann, Best, Lee, & Lovibond, 2013) includes failures
to replicate early studies in this field, and demonstrates
that in fact both types of conditioning require aware-
ness (Lovibond, Liu, Weidemann, & Mitchell, 2011).
A second issue is that the available evidence on con-
ditioned taste aversion seems incompatible with Smith
and Church’s case. In conditioned taste aversion, the
delay between cue and outcome is typically long, some-
times several hours. Hence, conditioned taste aversion
should be explicit by their definition—but this does not
seem to be the case. For example, conditioned taste
aversion in rats is still acquired when the illness-inducing
outcome is delivered under general anaesthesia
(Bermudez-Rattoni, Forthman, Sanchez, Perez, & Gar-
cia, 1988; Samuel, Taub, Paz, & Raz, 2018). Also, in
humans undergoing cancer treatment, conditioned taste
aversions are formed despite the patients being aware
that their illness/nausea is produced by the treatment
and not the novel foods eaten (Bernstein & Webster,
1980).
What is associative learning?
In order to discuss Smith and Church’s review of uncer-
tainty responses clearly, it is important to first exam-
ine their definition of associative learning more closely.
For Smith and Church, associative learning is a the-
ory of learning. They argue that the theory is a good
one, which is productively incomplete. It is incomplete
in the sense that it should not be expected to explain
all learning, just a coherent subset thereof. Smith and
Church seek to define that subset in terms of experi-
mental procedure – there are specific procedural condi-
tions under which an organism behaves in accordance
with associative theory. They additionally seek to de-
fine the subset neurally – associative theory is applica-
ble where certain brain structures, but not others, are
involved. The textual analysis on which this summary
is based is available in the Supplementary Materials.
We think there is a terminological issue with Smith
and Church’s definition; one that may lead to unin-
tended confusion. Specifically, the term associative learn-
ing is also commonly used to mean a class of problem
faced by an organism (see e.g. Mitchell, De Houwer, &
Lovibond, 2009; Wills, 2005). Thus, associative learn-
ing is the class of phenomena in which an organism
learns about a contingent relationship between events.
A number of different theories seek to explain these phe-
nomena; associative learning, in the sense Smith and
Church use the term, is a term used to describe some
of those theories. To reduce ambiguity, we will use the
term associative theory in place of Smith and Church’s
term associative learning from here on.
More specifically, by associative theory, we mean a
set of specific, formalized theories that together form
a class. These theories are typically link-formation ac-
counts, where experience of event pairings leads to str-
engthening or weakening of a connection between men-
tal representations, in a way that can be captured in
an algorithmic model. Canonical examples from the
history of psychology include Hebbian learning (Hebb,
1949), the delta rule (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams,
1986), and several other associative accounts (e.g. Kr-
uschke, 2001).
Membership of the class of associative theories is,
like most categories, vague at the boundaries. How-
ever, we think most theorists would wish to exclude
network models with recurrent connections from the
associative theory class. To not do so would make it
very difficult to reject the associative theory class, be-
cause some network models with recurrence are Univer-
sal Turing Machines (Siegelmann & Sontag, 1995), and
hence can compute anything computable on a modern
computer. Network models without recurrent connec-
tions are more limited in their computational power,
and hence provide one meaningful boundary to the ex-
tent of the term associative theory. Thus, we define the
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class of associative theories as those that can be instan-
tiated in a non-recurrent network architecture.
Uncertainty responses in non-human animals
Smith and Church argue that while some un-certainty-
response phenomena in non-human animals might be
described associatively, to do so would be to stretch
and strain the definition of associative theory unpro-
ductively. This conclusion, drawn previously by Smith,
Couchman, and Beran (2014), has been previously chal-
lenged by multiple authors (see e.g. Basile & Hampton,
2014; Crystal, 2014; Le Pelley, 2014). Smith and Church
do not consider these challenges in their review, so we
reprise them briefly here.
Smith and Church’s argument comes down to the
idea that associative theory should restrict itself to phys-
ically present stimuli (a lever, a light, etc.), and hence
learning involving (say) a memory (e.g. Hampton, 2001)
cannot be associative. This definition of associative the-
ory is at variance with decades of theoretical analy-
sis (e.g. Mackintosh, 1983). More crucially, it excludes
many standard conditioning phenomena, including cases
studied by Pavlov, from the possibility of being ac-
counted for by associative theory. For example, in a con-
ditioned inhibition procedure (Pavlov, 1927), a tone is
followed by food, but a compound of a tone and a light
is not. In this situation, the animal seems to learn that
the light prevents the delivery of food (as evidenced by,
for example, the light’s ability to reduce responding to
another cue). On the standard associative account, con-
ditioned inhibition occurs because presentation of the
tone on tone-light trials evokes a memory of food, and
this memory influences the learning that ensues. Simple
associative theories that permit this kind of assumption
provide a clear explanation of the findings of a wide
range of metacognition studies, including the studies
by Hampton (2001) and Shields, Smith, and Washburn
(1997) that Smith and Church highlight. For an ex-
tended discussion of this point, the reader is invited to
consult Le Pelley (2012).
Recommendations for comparative and cogni-
tive psychology
In their final section, Smith and Church argue that
small changes in the sequencing and timing of rein-
forcement qualitatively change the character of learn-
ing from associative to explicit. For the reasons we have
outlined above, we are skeptical about this conclusion,
and about the theoretical and applied potential of this
technique.
Our conclusion echoes a number of previous de-
bates in the literature. For example, the claims made
by Smith and Church on the basis of feedback delay are
similar in kind to claims made by others on the basis
of concurrent load (Filoteo et al., 2010), observational
training (Ashby, Maddox, & Bohil, 2002), and order ef-
fects (Spiering & Ashby, 2008). The first two of these
phenomena have alternative explanations; see Newell,
Moore, Wills, and Milton (2013) and Edmunds et al.
(2015), respectively. The third doesn’t seem to repli-
cate (Edmunds et al., 2019). In all three cases, use of
the information-integration category learning task was
central to these experiments.
We suggest that it may be time to move away from
the information-integration task to other, potentially
more diagnostic, procedures. We agree with Smith and
Church that one advantage of a clear definition of as-
sociative theory is that it facilitates our ability to study
behavior beyond the scope of associative accounts. Given
our earlier definition of associative theories as those
based on non-recurrent network architectures, looking
for behavior that requires recurrence to capture in a
network model seems like a reasonable place to start.
On that basis, rule-based generalization in the Shanks-
Darby task (Shanks & Darby, 1998), see Figure 1D-
F, is one promising option.1 Rule-based generalization
in this task is widely regarded as being beyond the
scope of associative theory (see Wills, Graham, Koh,
McLaren, & Rolland, 2011, for a discussion). In con-
trast, similarity-based generalization in this task can
be captured by most associative theories. The majority
of adult humans who learn the Shanks-Darby task to
a high criterion show rule-based generalization (Shanks
& Darby, 1998), while rats, pigeons, and adults un-
der concurrent load, show similarity-based generaliz-
ation (Maes et al., 2015; Wills et al., 2011). Rule-based
generalization in this task leads to more frontal lobe
activation than similarity-based generalization (Milton,
Bealing, Carpenter, Bennattayallah, &Wills, 2017). We
recommend the Shanks-Darby task as one promising
procedure to investigate behavior beyond the scope of
associative models.
Closing remarks
Smith and Church (2018) present what we describe as a
testimonial review, by which we mean they present only
the portion of the available evidence that is consistent
with their theory, not reporting conflicting or contra-
dictory evidence. An alternative approach is to present
a balanced review, where both supportive and appar-
ently contrary evidence are considered. A balanced re-
view can still arrive at a clear conclusion, to the ex-
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tent that the contrary evidence can be adequately ad-
dressed. We argue that the latter approach is more
open, transparent and, crucially, more likely to assist
scientific progress, than the former. By being clear about
what is both supportive, and problematic, for a particu-
lar account, future research is more effectively directed
to the questions that remain to be answered.
Note
1. Interested readers might also want to look at some
other promising procedures discussed by McLaren et al.
(2019).
Open practices statement
All the materials for this Comment are available at:
https://osf.io/gvdxq/
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